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ADOPTING THE EEOC DETERRENCE
APPROACH TO THE ADVERSE
EMPLOYMENT ACTION PRONG IN A
PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR TITLE VII
RETALIATION
Abstracts Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
protects employees who oppose what they consider to be workplace
discrimination from subsequent employer retaliation. The retaliation
provision, however, does not delineate the types of discriminatory acts
that an employer is prohibited from taking. Thus, the federal circuit
courts of appeals are divided on what types of acts rise to the level of
adverse action such that an employee plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of
the retaliation provision is to maintain unfettered access to Title VII's
remedial mechanisms. This Note argues that the most appropriate way to
do this is to ensure that all retaliatory acts that would likely deter an
employee from filing a discrimination charge or otherwise opposing
discriminatory activity should be prohibited.
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's prohibition on retalia-
tion is essential in ensuring that employees do not stiffer quietly
through workplace discrimination without voicing their complaints.'
When employees oppose what they consider io be discriminatory acts
or behavior, an employer may not then discriminate against those
employees for doing so. 2
Recently, retaliation claims have received a great deal of attention
from courts as well as legal commentators,s In part, this is due to the
See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2(a)(1)—(2), -3(a)
(2000).
2 See id. § 2000e-3(a).
3 See Ray v. Henderson. 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); Donna Smith Cude
Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mat-
tern: Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 14 Us. LAW. 373, 373-75 (1998); Joel A.
Kravetz, Deterrence v. Material Harm: Finding the Appropriate Standard to Define an "Adverse
Action" in Retaliation Claims Brought Under the Applicable Equal Employment Opportunity Stat-
utes, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 315, 316-18 (2002); Matthew J. Wiles, Note, Defining Adverse
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proliferation of retaliation claims. 4 Plaintiffs find that they can recover
on a retaliation claim even when the court dismisses their underlying
claim. 5
 Retaliation claims have been successful with juries, and in
2003, they accounted for 27.9% of all claims filed with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"). 8
Aside from the statistical increase in retaliation claims, legal com-
mentators and courts have been interested in these claims because the
federal circuit courts of appeals are divided on what types of retaliatory
actions an employer can be liable for taking, that is, what constitutes an
adverse employment action.? This disagreement is rooted in the ambi-
guity of the language in section 704(a) of Title VII, the retaliation pro-
vision, as well as the lack of legislative history associated with it. 8 At one
end of the debate, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits hold that an employer can be liable only for retaliation when it
makes an ultimate employment decision, such as hiring, discharging,
failing to promote, demoting, or changing compensation. 9 A second
group of circuits adopts an intermediate threshold, holding that deci-
sions materially affecting the terms and conditions of employment may
be actionable.") At the other end of the spectrum, a number of circuits,
including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh, Tenth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits employ a broad, case-by-
case approach, which focuses on the retaliatory motive rather than
solely on the severity of the action." The EEOC endorses a deterrence
Employment Action in Title VII Claims for Employer Retaliation: Determining the Most Appropriate
Standard, 27 U. DArrtm L. REV, 217, 218-20 (2001).
4 See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, CHARGE STATISTICS, FY 1992
THROUGH FY2003, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Mar. 8, 2004).
5 Pryor v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 212 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000);
see Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000);
Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).
6 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 4.
7 See Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002); Von
Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104
F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); Cude & Steger, supra note 3, at 373-75; Kravetz, supra note 3,
at 316-18; Wiles, supra note 3, at 218-20.
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000); Eric M.D. Zion, Note, Overcoming Adversity: Distin-
guishing Retaliation from General Prohibitions Under Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 76
INn. L.J. 191, 196 (2001).
° Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997); Afattertr, 104 F.3d at 707.
to See Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2003); Von Gunter, 243 F.3d at 866;
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997).
11 See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240; Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264
(10th Cir. 1998); Corneveaux v CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir.
1996); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
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approach, whereby any act reasonably likely to deter the plaintiff or
others from exercising their statutory rights amounts to an adverse em-
ployment action." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
the only one to adopt the EEOC's approach explicitly.°
The use of these different standards produces inconsistent results
depending on which jurisdiction the claim is brought in." Employers
and employees are left without a clear understanding of what facts are
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.° The U.S. Su-
preme Court should grant certiorari and end the disagreement
among the federal circuit courts of appeals as to which standard to
employ.° The most appropriate standard is the EEOC's deterrence
approach, primarily because it is the most consistent with the purpose
of Tide VII generally and the retaliation provision specifically, as well
as U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 17
Part LA of this Note provides an outline of the text of Title VII's
discrimination and retaliation provisions, along with a discussion of
their purpose." Part I.B explains what a plaintiff must demonstrate to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation.° Part LC explores the dif-
ferences in Tide VII's general discrimination and retaliation provisions
and relevant U.S. Supreme Court precedent addressing Title VII."
Next, Part II provides an overview of the current divide among
federal circuit courts of appeals by exploring the different approaches
that they employ. 21 Part III.A provides an example of the varying results
produced by the different approaches to defining an adverse employ-
ment action. 22 Part III,B argues that the deterrence approach is most
consistent with the language and purpose of Title VII, as articulated by
the U.S. Supreme Court." Part III.0 argues that courts should defer to
the reasoned judgment of the EEOC in adopting the deterrence ap-
proach. 24 Next, Part HID contends that in light of an affirmative de-
12 U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 8, at 8-13 (May 20,
1998); available at hitp:/ /www.eeoc.gov/ policy / docs/retalpdf.
13 Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
14 See infra notes 234-244 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 234-244 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 234-244 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 245-279 and accompanying text.
18 Sec infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
19 Sec infra notes 48-105 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 106-134 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 135-208 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 209-244 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 245-279 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 280-288 and accompanying text.
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fense to supervisory harassment established by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the deterrence approach is most logical to ensure that employ-
ees can adequately exercise their rights. 25 Finally, Part III.E contends
that employers have ways within Tide VII to manage their workplaces
effectively; the adverse employment action requirement is not, however,
the appropriate vehicle to take this concern into account. 26
I. TITLE VII AND THE RETALIATION PROVISION
A. Title VIPs Language, PU1POSC, and Use
The goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to eliminate
discrimination in employment, public accommodations, and public
education. 27 In terms of employment, this goal has been explained as
"achiev[ing] equality of employment opportunities and removing]
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees."28 The U.S. Supreme Court
has stated that Title VII protects employees against a workplace full of
"discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." 29
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Specifically, the general
discrimination provision of Title VII, section 703(a), makes it unlaw-
ful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.n
23 See infra notes 289-299 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 300-331 and accompanying text.
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)—(2) (2000).
28 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
28
 Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
3° 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
m Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1)—(2).
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To give effect to section 703(a), section 704(a) prohibits employers
from retaliating against employees who have filed a discrimination
charge or otherwise opposed a discriminatory employment practice." A
section 704(a) retaliation claim arises when an employee files a com-
plaint accusing an employer of discriminating against him or her, and
the employer retaliates against the employee for filing the initial claim."
Section 704(a) of Title VII prohibits retaliation by employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations against employees, ap-
plicants, union members, and other individuals who either (1) op-
posed an unlawful employment practice or (2) made a charge or
testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing tinder the statute.34
 These two different types of protection
are referred to as the "opposition" and "participation" clauses."
Retaliation charges serve as independent legal claims, which do
not depend on the validity of the underlying claim." In some cases,
courts have found that there was no discrimination based on the em-
ployee's protected class status, but nevertheless have allowed recovery
for an employer's adverse action taken in retaliation for the em-
ployee's filing of a claim of discrimination 37
 Given retaliation claims'
proven success with juries, it is becoming common for plaintiffs to
add them to their discrimination claims. 38 In fact, retaliation claims
52 Id. § 2000e-3(a).
" See id.
" See id. The retaliation provision reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employ-
ment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprentice-
ship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs,
to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discrimi-
nate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment. practice by this sub-
chapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this Sub-
chapter.
Id.
" See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-3(a).
56
 Pryor v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 212 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000);
see Passatino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 506 (9th Cir. 2000);
Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981).
37 Pryor, 212 F.3d at 980; see Passatino, 212 F.3d at 506; Payne, 654 F.2d at 1140.
sa See WAYNE N. OUTFEN ET Al.., PRACTICING LAW INST., WHEN YOUR EMPLOYER
THINKS YOU ACTED DISLOYALLY: THE GUARANTEES AND UNCERTAINTIES OF RETALIATION
LAW 151, 153 (2003); U.S. Equnt, EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM O N, supra note 4.
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increased by over 10% in the 1990s, 89 and in 2003, 27.9% of all claims
filed with the EEOC were for retaliation.°
For example, in 2000, in Fine v. Ryan International Airports, the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the plaintiff's jury verdict on her
retaliation claim, even though the underlying sexual harassment and
sex discrimination charges were dismissed because they were time-
barred and the employer offered a legitimate business reason that was
non-pretextual. 41 The jury awarded the plaintiff a mere $6000 in com-
pensatory damages, but $3.5 million in punitive damages. 42 The court
later reduced this to the statutory maximum of $300,000:13
Although it has been utilized heavily by plaintiffs, Congress spent
little time debating section 704(a), leaving courts with negligible legis-
lative history to elucidate interpretation of the section. 44
 In fact, the
House Judiciary Committee's report to Congress, which accompanied
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, contained commentary on section 704(a)
that was almost the precise wording of the section itself. 45 Thus, Con-
gress provided little guidance on how courts and employers should in-
terpret this provision 48 Because of this, differing standards have
emerged, making it difficult for employers and employees to under-
stand their rights and responsibilities with respect to retaliation. 47
B. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
1. Burden-Shifting Framework
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. u
Green held that a plaintiff in a discrimination case may demonstrate dis-
crimination, in the absence of direct evidence, by establishing a prima
facie case. 48 Once the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts
to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory rea-
39 See Wiles, supra note 3, at 218.
10 U.S. EQUAL. EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM . N, supra note 4.
41 305 F.3d 746, 751, 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2002).
42
 Id. at 751.
43 Id.
41 See Zion, supra note 8, at 196-97.
43 Sec id.
46 Sec id.
47 See infra notes 135-208 and accompanying text.
48 SCC 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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son for the employment action.'" Courts analyze Title VII retaliation
claims similarly to the way they analyze Title WI discrimination claims. 50
In order to establish a prima facie case for retaliation, the plaintiff
must show the following: (1) that he or she engaged in a statutorily
protected activity, (2) that he or she suffered some adverse action by his
or her employer, and (3) that there exists a causal link between the
protected expression and the adverse action." If the plaintiff estab-
lishes a prima facie case using this three-prong test, then the burden
shifts to the employer to produce a valid, non-retaliatory reason for the
action.52 In order to prevail, the plaintiff must then rebut the em-
ployer's proffered reason by proving that it is a mere pretext for dis-
crimination . 53
Taking this a step further, in 2000, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of discrimination and there is sufficient evi-
dence for a reasonable factfinder to discredit the defendant's proffered
nondiscriminatory explanation for the action, this may be enough to
sustain a finding of discrimination." In Reeves, the plaintiff established
a prima facie case, and the employer contended that the plaintiff was
fired for shoddy recordkeeping. 55 Although the plaintiff could not
show that lie was fired because of his age, he was able to show that he
had properly maintained the attendance records. 56 After the plaintiff
demonstrated that the employer's proffered reason was not supported
by the evidence, the jury was free to conclude that the actual reason for
the plaintiffs discharge was discriminatory. 57 This same principle ap-
plies in retaliation cases—a plaintiff can prevail by demonstrating that
the employer's proffered legitimate business reason is false."
2. First Prong: Protected Activities
In order to satisfy the first prong of a prima facie case, plaintiffs
must show that they either opposed an employer practice that is pro-
49 See id.
'" See Mon temayar v. City of San Antonio, 276 F.3d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 2001).
" Id.
52 See id.
53 Id. at 693.
54 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
55 Id. at 143.
56 Id. at 144-45.
57 Id. at 147-48.
58 Sec Montentayor, 276 F.3c1 at 693.
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hibited by Title VII, or participated in either filing a charge, testifying,
or assisting in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under Title VII°
The opposition clause covers a broader range of activities than
the participation clause, including public protests and letters to
officials; the protection against retaliation, however, is narrow.° The
basic limitation is that the employee's activities must be reasonable
and the employee must have a good faith belief that the opposed em-
ployer conduct was discriminatory.61
Conversely, the participation clause covers fewer activities, but
offers a greater degree of protection against retaliation. 62 The most
typical type of participation involves the plaintiff filing a discrimina-
tion charge against his or her employer, but also includes other activi-
ties, such as providing testimony or assisting in an investigation.° The
underlying charge of discrimination does not have to be valid, and
unlike the opposition clause, there is not a reasonableness standard.°
In 1976, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Hochstadt u Worcester
Foundation. for Experimental Biology established the extent to which an
employer can discipline or terminate an employee who opposed and
participated in filing a claim against allegedly discriminatory conduct. 65
In that case, the court held that the plaintiff's actions went beyond the
scope of protected opposition that section 704(a) is meant to encom-
pass because the plaintiff's complaints were exceedingly hostile, disrup-
tive, and excessive in the context of that particular workplace. 66 The
court reasoned that in cases in which plaintiffs constantly complain in a
hostile and disruptive way, the court must balance the setting in which
the activity arises and the interests and motivations of both the em-
ployer and employee.67 In Hochstadt, the employment setting was a
laboratory, and the employer had a strong interest in maintaining a
cooperative working environment, which would allow for the exchange
59 See U.S. Egon'. OPPORTUNITY Comm'N, supra note 12, at 8-3.
6° See id, at 8-3 to -11.
61 See id. at 8-7 to -8,
62 See id. at 8-10.
63
 See id. at 8-9 to -10.
" See U.S. EQUAI. OPPORTUNITY COMIWN, supra note 12, at 8-10.
65 See 545 F.2d 222, 227-29, 233 (1st Cir. 1976). •
66 See id. at 233.
67 See id.
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of research and ideas. 68 Therefore, by complaining in such a manner,
the plaintiff's actions were beyond the scope of protected opposition. 69
Courts have declined to extend the holding of Hoduladt to acts of
mere disloyalty because nearly every form of opposition could be con-
sidered disloyal." Courts that have followed Hochstadt evaluate the
level of interference with the plaintiffs job performance in determin-
ing whether the opposition falls outside the protection of Title VII
and serves as a legitimate reason for the employer's action.'"
Some courts hold that there is no protected activity involved when
a plaintiff complains in a disruptive or insubordinate manner; however,
other courts hold that this disruptive behavior provides the employer
with a legitimate business reason for the adverse action." In 2000, in
Matima v. Celli, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the em-
ployer had offered a legitimate reason for terminating the plaintiff's
employment when the plaintiff pressed his complaints in a disruptive
and insubordinate manner." The court noted that other circuits have
held similarly, although the courts disagree where to locate this princi-
ple within the prima facie case." Some courts find that the plaintiff did
not engage in protected oppositional activity, whereas others find that
the employer's proffered reason for the conduct was legitimate."
Its Matima, however, because the plaintiff actually filed a formal
complaint, which is unquestionably a protected activity, the burden
shifted to the employer, who articulated the employee's disruptive and
a° Id.
69 Id. at 230.
7° See Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1569, 1570 (2d Cir. 1989) (agree-
ing with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that Hochstadt must be read narrowly to ensure
that valid opposition by employees asserting civil rights is not chilled); EEOC v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that if discipline may be
imposed because of mere disloyal conduct, protected activities under section 704(a) would
essentially be eliminated because all opposition is in some way disloyal to the employer).
71 See Crown Zellerbach, 720 F.2d at 1015.
72 See Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Robbins v. Jefferson
County Sch. Dist., 186 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the employee's activi-
ties were not reasonable and did not constitute protected opposition), abrogated on other
grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); Laughlin v. Metro.
Wash. Airports Au th., 149 F.3c1 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding as a matter of law that the
plaintiff did not engage in protected activities); Rosser s Laborers' Intl Union, Local 438,
616 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that although the plaintiff established a prima
facie case for retaliation, the employer offered a legitimate business reason for the adverse
action it took because the employee's political opposition put her loyalty and cooperation
in dispute).
73 See Matima. 228 F.3d at 80-81.
74 See id. at 79-80.
75 See id.; Robbins, 186 F.3d at 1260; Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259; Rosser, 616 F.2d at 224.
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inappropriate behavior as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory ground for
the action. 76
 The question then became whether the employee had
demonstrated that the stated reason was a pretext for illegal retalia-
tion." Because there was substantial evidence that the plaintiff's behav-
ior was significantly disruptive, the court upheld the jury's finding that
the employer would have fired the plaintiff even in the absence of re-
taliation. 78
Additionally, for an oppositional activity to be considered pro-
tected, plaintiffs must have a good faith belief that the conduct of which
they complain was discriminatory. 79 In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Clark County School District v. Breeden addressed the limit of this good faith
standard necessary to satisfy the first prong of the prima facie case.8°
The Court held that no one could reasonably and in good faith believe
that the recitation of an inappropriate comment made by an applicant,
stated in the context of screening that applicant, violated Title 'V11. 81
Therefore, the plaintiff did not engage in a protected activity.82
Once plaintiffs establish that they have engaged in a protected
activity, they next must establish that the employer took some sort of
adverse action against them.° This next prong is the most conten-
tious and is discussed at length in this Note. 84
3. Second Prong: Adverse Employment Action
Much of the debate surrounding retaliation claims involves the
second prong of the plaintiff's prima facie case, specifically, what con-
stitutes an adverse employment action. 85 The federal circuit courts of
appeals are divided as to what standard courts should use in determin-
ing whether employer conduct amounts to an adverse action in a re-
76 See Matima, 228 F.3d at 80.
77 See id.
78 Ste id. at 80-81.
"Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1994).
s° See 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001). In Clark County, the plaintiff alleged that she was sexu-
ally harassed when a manager, in discussing whether to hire a prospective employee,
merely repeated an inappropriate comment that the prospective employee made, in the
presence of the plaintiff. See id. at 269.
Si See id. at 269-70.
82 See id. at 270.
See, e.g., Montemayor, 276 F.3d at 692.
84 See infra notes 135-331 and accompanying text.
85 See Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecornrns., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002); Von
Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104
F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
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taliation claim. 86 This disagreement stems from the ambiguity of the
language in section 704(a) of Title VII, the retaliation provision, as well
as the lack of legislative history associated with it. 87 The U.S. Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits take a restrictive approach
and hold that an employer can only be liable for retaliation when it
makes an ultimate employment decision, such as hiring, discharging,
failing to promote, demoting, or changing compensation.88 The U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits use
an intermediate threshold and hold that decisions materially affecting
the terms and conditions of employment may be actionableP A third
group, including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh,
Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits, employs a broad,
case-by-case approach, which focuses on the retaliatory motive rather
than solely on the severity of the action. 90 The EEOC endorses a broad
but slightly different approach, whereby any act reasonably likely to de-
ter the plaintiff or others from exercising their statutory rights amounts
to an adverse employment action, 91 The Ninth Circuit has embraced
the EEOC's approach.92 At issue in the adverse employment action de-
bate is whether retaliatory harassment should constitute an adverse
employment action."
4. Third Prong: Causal Connection
Finally, a Title VII retaliation plaintiff must prove that the adverse
employment action was causally related to the protected activity. 94 Ti-
tle VII requires the plaintiff to show that the employer was aware of
e6 See Shannon, 292 F.3d at 716; Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866; Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
87 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e•3(a) (2000); Zion, supra note 8, at 196-97.
BB See Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997); Matters, 104 F.3d at
707. Although the Eighth Circuit has not explicitly moved away from the restrictive ap-
proach, the court in 2009 found that an employer's practice of [Uniting the plaintiff's
bathroom and other breaks, refusing to provide her with job assistance, yelling at her for
making mistakes, withholding privileges allowed to other employees, and attempting to
dissuade her from making further complaints constituted sufficient and material disadvan-
tages to support a retaliation claim. Baker v. Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir.
2004).
89 See Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2003); Von Gunten, 243 17.3d at 866;
Torres v. Pisani:), 116 F.3d 625, 690 (2(1 Cir. 1997).
9° See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); Gunnell v. Utah Valley
State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998); Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. his. Group, 76
F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996).
91 See U.S. EQUAL OProR'ruNt -ry COM M'N, supra note 12, at 8-13.
92 Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
03 See Kravetz, supra note 3, at 368; infra notes 214-244 and accompanying text.
94 U.S. Num, OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 12, at 8-15.
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the plaintiff's protected activity and that a retaliatory motive played a
part in the employment action." Circumstantial evidence is typically
enough to show that the employer both knew about the protected
activity and that a retaliatory motive played a role, 96
In establishing this causal connection, most plaintiffs rely on the
timing of the adverse action and a demonstration that the person tak-
ing the adverse action knew about the protected activity.97 In cases in
which the alleged retaliatory action is not immediate, there is no pre-
cise test for how long is too long to establish temporal proximity." In
2001, in Clark Counly, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, without
other evidence of causality, an action taken twenty months after the
plaintiff complained of discrimination was not enough to establish
that it was retaliatory.99
 The Court stated that where timing has been
enough for the plaintiff to establish the third prong of the prima facie
case, the temporal proximity must be "very close.mo
Although temporal proximity is often the basis for establishing a
causal connection, a plaintiff cannot rely on proximity alone to estab-
lish this prong of the prima facie case. 101 In addition to the time-frame,
a plaintiff may also provide evidence that similarly situated employees
who did not engage in the protected activity were treated differently by
the employer.'" When the employer can show that similarly situated
employees were treated in the same manner, the plaintiff's claim will be
unsuccessful absent direct evidence of a retaliatory motive.'"
Although courts may differ in how they interpret all prongs of
the prima facie case, the most pronounced debate involves what con-
stitutes an adverse employment action. 10" A look at the text of Title
VII elucidates the disagreement.'"
93 See id.
98 See id.
97 See id. at 8-18.
98 See Lisa Cooney, Understanding and Preventing Workplace Retaliation, 88 Mass. L. REV.
3,14 (2003).
99 532 U.S. at 274.
100 Id. at 273.
101 See Cooney, supra note 98, at 14.
102 See id. at 15.
'° See id.
104 See Shannon, 292 F.3d at 716; lbu Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866; Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707;
OATEN ET Al.., supra note 38, at 171-83.
1 °5 See infra notes 106-113 and accompanying text.
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.C. Language of Title VII and Relevant Precedent: Adverse Employment Action
1. Comparing the Language of Sections 703(a) and 704(a)
The most contentious aspect of retaliation charges is the second
prong of the prima facie case-what constitutes an adverse employ-
ment action.106 The lack of consensus as to what types of employment
actions are adverse sterns from the ambiguity of the term "discrimina-
tion" as used in section 704(a).1 07 In the general discrimination provi-
sion, section 703(a), employers are prohibited from discriminating
"against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment:40s By delineating the ways an
employer cannot discriminate against an employee, section 703(a)
sets the limits for an actionable discrimination claim. 09
Section 704(a), conversely,.does not limit the term discrimination
by listing certain actions. 110 Instead, it states that "it shall be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for am employer to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for:employment" because that person has
engaged in protected activities.'" The U.S. Supreme Court has not
ruled on how the term "to discriminate" should be defined for the
purposes of the retaliation provision. 112 Some general guidance on
how to interpret Title VII, however, can be found in the Court's sec-
tion 703(a) precedent and its holding as to how the term "employee"
in section 704(a) should be interpreted."s
1" See Shannon, 292 F.3d at 716; Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866; Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
'° 7 Sec 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000). See generally Linda M. Glover, Note, Title VII Sec-
tion 704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning.a Blind Eye Toward Justice, 38 pious, L. REV. 577, 585
(2001) (arguing that courts imposing higher thresholds for adverse employment actions,
attempting to mirror the general discrimination provision threshold, overlook the inde-
pendent interest protected by section 704(a)); Zion, supra note 8, at 215-16 (contending
that there is little support in the history, language, or purpose of section 704(a) that re-
quires an adverse action to be an ultimate employment decision).
108 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
109 See id.
110 See id. § 2000e-3(a).
In Id. (emphasis added).
112 See id.
113 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997);
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
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2. General Guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court on Section 703(a)
a. Hostile Work Environment Liability Under Section 703(a)
The U.S. Supreme Court's broad interpretation of section 703(a),
whereby the Court recognized claims based on a hostile work envi-
ronment, a cause of action not explicitly found in the text, provides
some context for interpreting the retaliation provision.'" Reinforcing
the broad construction of Title VII, in 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the language of
section 703(a) is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination." 5
Rather, the Court reasoned that the phrase "'terms, conditions or
privileges of employment'" demonstrates that the legislature intended
to encompass the entire spectrum of disparate treatment between men
and women in employment. 116 The Court held that section 703(a) of
Title VII encompasses claims of a hostile work environment when dis-
crimination is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the
plaintiffs employment and create an abusive working environment. 117
Although the Court adopted a broad construction of discrimina-
tion in section 703(a), the Court also stated that Title VII is not a gen-
eral civility code. 118 In order for a hostile work environment claim to be
actionable, the environment must be sufficiently hostile or abusive.'"
To determine whether such an environment exists, courts consider the
totality of the circumstances, including (1) the frequency of the dis-
criminatory conduct, (2) the severity of the conduct, (3) whether the
conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, and (4) whether the
conduct unreasonably interfered with the employee's work. 12°
After defining a cause of action for hostile work environments,
the Court addressed the extent to which liability would flow to the
employer for supervisory harassment outside the scope of employ-
ment."' In 1998, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v.
City of Boca Raton, two decisions handed down the same day, the Court
held that employers may be held liable for unlawful harassment
114 See infra notes 115-129 and accompanying text.
111 477 U.S. at 64.
116 Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000)).
117 See id. at 67.
118 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
10 See id. at 787-88.
120 Id.
121 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
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committed by their employees placed in supervisory roles. 122 In Ellerth
and Faragher, the Court declared that employers may not avoid liabil-
ity by claiming that a supervisor acted outside the scope of employ-
ment. 123 Previous decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals had
distinguished between quid pro quo harassment, for which the em-
ployer could be held vicariously liable, and a hostile work environ-
ment, for which it would not. 124 The Court eliminated this distinction
and held that employers could be held vicariously liable for either
cause of action. 125
Additionally, the Court established what is now referred to as the
Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to supervisory harassment.'" In
cases in which the plaintiff suffers no tangible employment action, yet
is subjected to a hostile work environment, the employer may establish
an affirmative defense to charges that a supervisor harassed a subordi-
nate employee. 127 An employer can avoid liability in cases where no
tangible employment action was taken by showing (1) that the em-
ployer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that the plaintiff employee unrea-
sonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective op-
portunities provided by the employer or otherwise failed to avoid
harm. 128 This defense has implications for the interpretation of an ad-
verse employment action in a claim of retaliation. 129
b. Retaliation Provision Construed Broadly
In addition to interpreting section 703(a) broadly to incorporate
causes of action that are not explicit in the text, the U.S. Supreme Court
has likewise interpreted section 704(a) liberally, outside the context of
adverse employment actions, in order to effectuate its purpose.'" In
1997, in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Court determined whether former
employees were covered under section 704(a). 131 The language of the
122 See Faraglier, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
123 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
124 Sec Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765-66; Edward A. Marshall, Note, Excluding Participation in
Internal Complaint Mechanisms from Absolute Retaliation Protection: Why Everyone, Including the
Employer; Loses, 5 Em rt.tvEK Rm. & PoCv .J. 549,571-72 (2001).
125 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765-66.
126 See Marshall, supra note 124, at 571.
127 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
128 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
129 See infra notes 289-299 and accompanying text.
1" See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345-46.
131 See id. at 339.
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section makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any
of his employees or applicants for employment: 132 The Court held that
the term "employees" included former employees, because read with
the rest of the provision, it would be illogical to prohibit retaliatory dis-
charge, but not allow discharged employees to bring a charge of retalia-
tion.'" This broad interpretation of "employees" is consistent with the
primary purpose of section 704(a), which the Court held is to
"[m]aintain [1 unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms."'"
H. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS
Notwithstanding the guidance provided by Title VII's language
and U.S. Supreme Court precedent, there has been no uniform stan-
dard established for defining adverse employment action in retalia-
tion claims.' Thus, federal circuit courts of appeals differ in their
interpretations."6 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits employ the narrowest view and hold that an adverse employ-
ment action occurs only when the employer makes an ultimate em-
ployment decision.'" A number of other circuits, including the U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits,
utilize an intermediate standard, holding that a plaintiff establishes an
adverse employment action when the employer's act materially affects
the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment. 138 The U.S.
Courts of Appeals for the First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and District
of Columbia Circuits apply a broad, case-by-case approach, focusing
more on the defendant's retaliatory motive than on the severity of the
act.'" Finally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit employ a deterrence
152 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
133 See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345.
134 Id. at 346.
155 See Von Gun ten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Gunnell v. Utah Valley
State Coll„ 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d
1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
"6 See lint Gunten, 234 F.3d at 866; Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264; City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d
at 1300; Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707.
157 See Banks s E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003);
Ledergerber v. &angler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997); Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709.
"a See Akers v. Alvey, 338 F.3d 491, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2003); Vim Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866;
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997).
139 See Ray V. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264;
Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996); Wyatt v. City of
Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994); Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331
(D.C. Cir. 1991).
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approach, holding that the adverse employment action requirement
is satisfied when the employer's act is reasonably likely to deter the
plaintiff or others from engaging in the protected activity. 140
A. Restrictive Standard: Ultimate Employment Decisions
A minority of jurisdictions, namely the U.S. Courts of Appeals for
the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, take the restrictive position that plaintiffs
may only claim retaliation in ultimate employment decisions, such as
hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating an
employee."'
In 1997, in Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Company, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held against a plaintiff who alleged that her employer
retaliated against her after she filed a Title VII sexual harassment, hos-
tile work environment claim with the EEOC. 142 The plaintiff offered a
number of incidents that she considered retaliatory, including a visit
from a supervisor in her home, in violation of company policy, after she
took a day of vacation for a work-related illness, a reprimand for not
being at her work station, coworker and supervisor hostility, lack of re-
sponse from the employer to a call of concern from her doctor, nega-
tive performance reviews, and a missed pay increase." 3 The Fifth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed its 1995 holding in Dallis v. Rubin, where it stated that
Title VII was intended to address ultimate employment decisions, as
opposed to every employment decision that potentially has a periph-
eral effect on those ultimate decisions.'" The court. in Mattern reasoned
that because section 704(a) does not mention the "vague harms" con-
tamed in section 703(a), "discrimination" as used in section 704(a) in-
cludes only ultimate employment decisions." 5 In fact, the court as-
14° See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243; U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 12, at 8-13.
141 See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707 (seminal case articulating the ultimate employment
standard); see also Banks, 320 F.3d at 575 (adopting Mattern's rationale and holding that
employer's implementation of a new position with reading requirement and new salary
structure was not an ultimate employment decision); Ledergerbei; 122 F.3d at 1144 (holding
that reassigning an employee to a more stressful position where she had more difficult
employees to supervise was not an ultimate employment decision actionable under section
704(a)). But see Baker v. Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 830 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that
employer's practice of limiting the plaintiffs bathroom and other breaks, refusing to pro-
vide her with job assistance, yelling at her for making mistakes, withholding privileges al-
lowed to other employees, and attempting to dissuade her from snaking further com-
plaints constituted sufficient and material disadvantages to support a retaliation claim).
142 104 F.3d at 706, 707, 708.
' 43 Id, at 705-06.
'" Id. at 707 (citing Doll is v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995)).
145 See id. at 708-09.
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sumed it was established that only such decisions would be covered un-
der section 704(a). 146 Without deciding whether the missed pay in-
crease was an ultimate employment decision, the court held that the
plaintiffs retaliation claim was not actionable because there was no
evidence that the action was retaliatory, and the other incidents did not
rise to the level of an adverse employment action. 147
The Eighth Circuit has also adopted a restrictive standard. 148 In
1997, in Ledergerber v. &angler, it held that a lateral transfer involving only
minor changes in working conditions, including a change in staff, and
no reduction in pay or benefits, is not an adverse employment action. 149
The court stated that a lateral transfer does not constitute an adverse
employment action, reasoning that if it did, every minute decision that
an irritable employee did not like would amount to a discrimination
claim.'" The court concluded that although the action at issue may
have had some peripheral effect on the plaintiff's employment, it did
not rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision, and thus it was
not a violation of Title VIPs prohibition on retaliation.'"
A number of Eighth Circuit judges, however, have reluctantly ap-
plied the restrictive standard, making it clear that they would decide
the case differently absent contrary precedent. 182 A significant issue
that arises with the strict interpretation in the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
is whether retaliatory harassment can ever be covered under section
704(a). 1"
B. Intermediate Standard: Materially Adverse
A majority of federal circuit courts of appeals do not follow the
Fifth and Eighth Circuits' restrictive interpretation of what constitutes
an adverse action. 184 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
146 See id. at 708.
1 " Sec Mattem, 104 F.3d at 709-10. In 2004, in Davis v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, the Fifth
Circuit reaffirmed its reliance on the ultimate employment decision standard and held that
the denial of a promotion because of a rigged reading test was an ultimate employment
decision and hence an adverse employment action. 383 F.3d 309, 320 (5th Cir. 2004).
148 See Ledugvibr, 122 F.3d at 1144.
146 Id. at 1144-45.
1" Id. at 1145.
151 Id.
152 See, e.g., LePique v. Hove, 217 F.3d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that the court
is bound by precedent invoking the restrictive requirement); id. (Heaney, J., concurring)
(reluctantly concurring based on precedent).
151 See Km, vetz, supra note 3, at 368.
151 See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240.
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Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have held that a plaintiff need not
show an ultimate employment decision, but instead must make the
same showing of a "material adverse action" that applies to any Title
VII claim. 155 This approach to adverse employment action has been
classified as the intermediate view.' Nonetheless, this view requires
relatively significant consequences to the employee before the em-
ployer is held liable. 157
In 1997, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Robinson v. City of
Pittsburgh held that the following acts of reprisal did not constitute
adverse employment actions: restricted job duties, reassignment and
failure to transfer the plaintiff out of an assignment in which she was
tinder the direct command of the alleged harasser, unsubstantiated
oral reprimands, and several derogatory comments)" The court con-
cluded that, aside from firing or refusing to rehire an employee, re-
taliation is actionable only when it changes the employee's compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment; deprives him or
her of employment opportunities; or negatively affects his or her
status as an employee. 159
Similarly, in the same year in Torres v Pisano, the Second Circuit
held that a request by the plaintiff's supervisor that she drop her
EEOC charge did not constitute an adverse employment action. 1 °9
Although the plaintiff stated that the demands made her feel fright-
ened and intimidated, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not
shown that she suffered a materially adverse change in the terms and
conditions of employment. 191
 The court stated that it may be possible
for a demand for withdrawal of an EEOC charge to amount to retalia-
tion when the demand alters the conditions of the plaintiff's . em-
ployment in a material way, such as impliedly threatening to discharge
the plaintiff. 102
 The court concluded, however, that employers may
take reasonable protective measures in defending themselves without
155 See infra notes 158-170 and accompanying text.
156 See Michael Rusie, Note, The Meaning of Adverse Employment Action in the Context of Ti-
tle VI! Retaliation Claims, 9 WASH. U. & Pot.'Y 379, 389 (2002); see also Ray, 217 F.3d at
1240 (discussing the circuit split and stating that the Second and Third Circuits hold an
intermediate position).
157 See Akers, 338 F.3d at 497-98; Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 866; City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d
at 1300; Torres, 116 F.3d at 640.
158 120 F.3d at 1300.
156 Id.
' 60 116 F.3d at 639.
161 Id. at 640.
162 Id.
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violating section 704(a) of Title VII. 163 Two years later, however, in
Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that unchecked coworker harassment could be an
adverse employment action if it is sufficiently severe.'"
Employing a similar middle-of-the-road standard, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals expressly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's re-
strictive standard and held that any employer actions that materially
affect the terms and conditions of employment are actionable under
Title VII's retaliation provision.' 65 In 2001, in Von Gunten v. Maryland,
the Fourth Circuit held that employer action must at least meet some
threshold level of substantiality for unlawful discrimination to be cog-
nizable under section 704(a) by adversely affecting the terms and
conditions of the plaintiff's employment.' 66
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the interme-
diate view that an adverse employment action must materially affect the
terms of employtnent 167 In 2000, the Sixth Circuit in Morris v. Oldham
County Fiscal Court, employing an intermediate standard, held that se-
vere or pervasive supervisory harassment can amount to an adverse
employment action.' 68 Conversely, in 2003, the Sixth Circuit in Alters v.
Alvey held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she had suffered
an adverse employment action because she had not established a
significant change in her employment status, such as being hired, fired,
not receiving a promotion, being reassigned with significantly different
responsibilities, suffering a significant change in benefits, or other fac-
tors unique to her particular situation. 169 Although the court examined
the claim on the facts specific to the case, the court's focus on
"significant" changes to the plaintiff's employment is consistent with
the materially adverse standard.'"
The intermediate standard interprets the term "discrimination" in
section 704(a) as being constrained by the language of section
16.5 Id.
164 180 F.3d 426,446 (2d Cir. 1999).
165 Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865.
166 See id.
167 Sec Akers, 338 F.3d at 497-98; Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784,
791-92 (6th Cir. 2000).
166 201 F.3d at 792.
166 338 F.3d at 497-98.
i" See id. at 498-99. The Sixth Circuit refused to adopt the EEOC's deterrence ap-
proach and reaffirmed its reliance on the intermediate standard in 2004 in White u Bur-
lington Northern Ce Santa Fe Railway Co. See 364 F.3d 789,800 (6th Cir. 2004).
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703(a).' 7 ' Reading the two provisions together, courts hold that em-
ployment actions that materially affect the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. are serious enough to satisfy the second prong of the prima
facie case for retaliation) 72 This standard requires less than an ultimate
employment decision, but still focuses on the severity of the employer's
action)"
C. Broad Case-by-Case Approach
Other federal circuit courts of appeals have applied a more liberal
standard." Most of these circuits apply a case-by-case approach, focus-
ing on the totality of the circumstances)" The U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the First, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and Districtof Columbia Circuits
generally define adverse employment action liberally)" These courts
tend to emphasize the employer's motive rather than the effect of the
employment action. 177 Likewise; these circuits apply a case-by-case ap-
proach that takes into account all relevant circumstances in a given
case)"
- The First Circuit Court of Appeals employed such a case-by-case
approach, but at the same time required some level of materiality)" In
1995, in Wyatt v. City of Boston, the First Circuit held that the plaintiff be-
ing denied a promotion, receiving negative performance evaluations,
and being transferred without a choice concerning which class to teach,
171 See Morris, 201 F.3d at 791-92.
172 See id.
175 See id.
174 See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243; Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264; Cortteueaux, 76 F.3d at 1507;
Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15-16; Passer, 935 F.2d at 331.
175 See Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264; Corneveaux, 76 F.3d at 1507; 115att, 35 F.3d at 15-16;
Passer, 935 F.2d at 331.
176 See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240.
177 See Rusie, supra note 156, at 393.
175 See Wiles, supra note 3, at 228-29.
179 Sec Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 725 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that significantly re-
ducing an employee's responsibility can amount to an adverse employment action); Wyatt,
35 F.3d at 15-16 (holding that demotions, disadvantageous transfers, negative job evalua-
tions, and toleration of harassment by coworkers can constitute adverse employment ac-
tion). But see Go v. Boston Police Dep't, 312 F.3d 6, 14-15 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
unsupported assertions of loss of supervisory authority, exclusion from office meetings,
and diminished communication regarding office matters were insufficient to establish the
requisite material change in working conditions); Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc.,
304 F.3d 7, 25 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that although adverse employment actions do not
have to involve economic loss, in order to be adverse, a transfer has to be accompanied by
a tangible change in duties or working conditions).
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if proven, would constitute adverse employment actions.im The court
noted that adverse actions include demotions, disadvantageous transfers
or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job evalua-
tions, and toleration of harassment by other employees. 181 Although
adopting a broad approach, in Mackie u Maine, the First Circuit estab-
lished a limit to this liberal construction of adverse employment actions,
stating that "Mork places are rarely idyllic retreats" and that employ-
ment decisions do not rise to the level of an adverse employment action
merely because the plaintiff disagrees with or is upset by them.'
The Eleventh Circuit has likewise broadly construed the re-
quirement of adverse action. 183 In 1998, in Wideman. a Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the restrictive standard
and reasoned that the language of section 704(a) extends protection
against retaliation to adverse actions that fall short of ultimate em-
ployment decisions. 184 The court did not define the threshold for ad-
verse employment actions, but noted that in that specific case, the acts
the plaintiff described, taken together, were sufficient to constitute
prohibited discrimination. 185 The acts included improperly listing the
plaintiff as a no-show on a day she was scheduled to have off, forcing
the plaintiff to work on that day without a lunch break, issuing written
reprimands to the plaintiff, issuing a one-day suspension, soliciting
employees for negative statements about the plaintiff, delaying medi-
cal treatment when the plaintiff was having an allergic reaction, and
threatening to shoot the plaintiff in the head. 186 Although these ac-
tions were not ultimate employment decisions, the court found that
they were adverse employment actions under section 704(a), 187
Similarly, in 2002, in Shannon u Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc.,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's lateral reassignment alone
was insufficient to amount to adverse employment action.' The reas-
signment, however, together with the denial of overtime and the alloca-
18° 35 F.3d at 16.
181 Id. at 15-16.
182 75 F.3d at 725.
' 83 See Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002);
Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998).
184 141 F.3d at 1456.
'all See id.
186 Sec id. at 1455.
187 See id. at 1456.
188 292 F.3d at 716.
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.tion of a more difficult assignment and an tin-air-conditioned van, did
amount to unlawful retaliation. 199
In endorsing a similarly broad approach to the adverse employ-
ment action requirement, in 1996, in Knox u State of Indiana, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that retaliatory harassment by a co-worker, which
the supervisor knew about and failed to remedy, constituted an ad-
verse employment action. 190 The court noted that the statute purpose-
fully did not take a "laundry list" approach to retaliation, because it
can come in as many types as employers can create. 191
Likewise, the Tenth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of
Appeals have held that non-tangible, less severe acts or conduct consti-
tute adverse actions. 192 In 1998, in Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, the
Tenth Circuit held that sufficiently severe coworker harassment could
amount to adverse employment action. 195
 Similarly, in 1991, in Passer v.
American Chemical Society, the District of Columbia Circuit ruled that
canceling a public symposium in the plaintiff's honor, after he filed an
age discrimination complaint, was sufficiently adverse to support his
retaliation claim. 194
D. EEOC Deterrence Approach
The EEOC Compliance Manual offers guidance on how courts
should approach the adverse employment action requirement. 195 The
Ninth Circuit specifically applies the EEOC's deterrence approach. 196
The EEOC Compliance Manual reads, 'The statutory retaliation
clauses prohibit any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory mo-
tive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from en-
gaging in protected activity: 197 The Manual goes on to point out that
"petty slights and trivial annoyances are not actionable, as they are not
likely to deter protected activity."98
 The EEOC opposes the strict inter-
log Id. at 715, 716.
16° 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
Is" Id. Although the Seventh Circuit has not explicitly adopted the EEOC deterrence
approach, it has cited approvingly both Ray and the EEOC Compliance Manual, demon-
strating that perhaps it is in line with the deterrence approach. See Herrnreiter v. Chi.
Flom. Auth., 315 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2002).
162 Sec Gunnell, 152 F.3d at 1264; Corneveaux, 76 F.3d at 1507; Passer, 935 F.2d at 331.
193 152 F.3d at 1264.
194 935 F.2d at 331.
106 See U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 12, at 8-11 to -15.
196 Sec Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243.
197 See U.S. Equist.OeroirruNITY COMM'N, supra note 12, at 8-13 (emphasis added).
1991d.
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pretations of this requirement and endorses the view that the degree of
harm suffered by the individual goes to the issue of damages, not
liability. 188 The Ninth Circuit has expressly adopted the EEOC's deter-
rence approach, whereas other circuits applying the broad standard
employ a general case-by-case approach, which is nonetheless
consistent with the EEOC's standard. 20°
In 2000, in Ray v. Henderson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted an expansive view of the type of actions sufficient to consti-
tute adverse employment actions. 201 In Henderson, the court found
that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment in his hostile work environment retaliation claim. 202 The
plaintiff in Ray claimed he was verbally abused in a manner related to
his complaints, was the subject of a number of pranks, and was falsely
accused of misconduct. 203 In analyzing the case, the Ninth Circuit
traced the division among the circuits and aligned itself with the cir-
cuits endorsing the broad approach, specifically agreeing with the
EEOC that adverse employment action means any adverse treatment
that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter
the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity. 204
Thus, the court found that an employee has a cause of action under
section 704(a) for retaliatory harassment."'
The case-by-case and deterrence approaches focus more on the
employer's retaliatory motive than the objective severity of the action
itself.206 Although minor changes or annoyances will not constitute an
adverse employment action, actions less than those materially affect-
ing the terms and conditions of employment can be sufficient. 297 The
various approaches courts take to the adverse employment action re-
quirement produce varying results in cases with similar facts. 208
199 Id.
200 See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1240,1293.
201 See id. at 1243.
202 Id. at 1245-46.
202 Id.
204 Id. at 1240-43.
200 See Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245.
206 See id. at 1240-41; U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY Col...Inert, supra note 12, at 8-13.
SeeU.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM O N, supra note 12, at 8-13.
203 See infra notes 215-242 and accompanying text.
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III. THE DETERRENCE APPROACH SHOULD BE UNIVERSALLY ADOPTED
TO PUT AN END TO CONTRADICTORY RESULTS
The definition of adverse employment action should be uniform
in all jurisdictions to give plaintiffs and employers a clear sense of their
rights and responsibilities in the retaliation context. 2® All federal cir-
cuit courts of appeals should adopt the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission's broad, deterrence approach because it is most con-
sistent with the language of Title VII, as well as U.S. Supreme Court
precedent. 210
 Additionally, the EEOC's support. of this standard should
be accorded some deference, as it is the administrative body responsi-
ble for enforcing Title 'VH. 211 The broad approach is also the most logi-
cal in light of the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense; otherwise, the
result would be harsh and unfair to plaintiffs. 212 Filially, critics' fear of
the broad standard—that the ability of employers to effectively manage
their workplace will be threatened by the broad approach—is best ad-
dressed in other elements of a retaliation claim, 2u
A. Different Standards for Defining Adverse Employment Actions
Produce Inconsistent Results
The standard a court uses to determine whether an employer has
taken an adverse employment action can directly determine the plain-
tiff's success in proving his or her case.2" The facts of Moths v. Oldham
County Fiscal Court, decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
2000, provide a good example.215
 Judy Morris, the plaintiff, worked as a
secretary providing clerical support for the Oldham County Road De-
partment starting in 1984. 216 In 1994, Brent Likins became Morris's su-
pervisor.217 Morris alleged that Likins repeatedly made jokes with sexual
overtones, made several comments about Morris's dress, and once re-
ferred to her as "Hot Lips."218
 During this time, Likins was responsible
for evaluating Morris's job performance. 219 In November 1994, he gave
209 Sec infra notes 215-242 and accompanying text.
210 See infra notes 245-279 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 280-288 and accompanying text.
212 See infra notes 289-299 and accompanying text.
213 See infra notes 300-331 and accompanying text.
214 Sec infra notes 234-242 and accompanying text.
213 See 201 F.3d 784,786-88 (6th Ci•. 2000).
210 hi. at 786.
217 Id. at 787.
219 1d.
219 Id.
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Morris a rating of "excellent."220 In March of 1995, he gave her a rating
of "very good."221 When Morris asked why her rating dropped, Likins
stated, in front of another employee, that if she went into his office, af-
ter they were finished he would mark her as excellent. 222 Morris and the
other employee interpreted this as meaning that if she performed sex-
ual acts on Likins, he would change her performance review. 223 Morris
complained about these acts to County Judge John Black, who wrote a
letter to Likins stating that he hoped the two of them would work it
out.224 After receiving that letter, Likins began ignoring Morris. 225 He
also became overly critical of her work.226 Morris complained again, and
Judge Black relocated Likins's office and ordered Likins not to commu-
nicate with Morris without a third person present. 227
Likins ignored Judge Black's instructions. 228 Instead, he visited
Morris's office unaccompanied fifteen times, called her on the tele-
phone over thirty times, and drove to her office and sat outside in his
truck, making faces at her through her window. 229 On one occasion,
Likins followed Morris home and gave her "the finger" from his
truck. 2" Likins also destroyed the television Morris occasionally
watched in the office and threw roofing nails onto her home driveway
several times. 231 Because of this conduct, Morris began having anxiety
attacks and took sick leave from work. 232 Ultimately, Morris filed sexual
harassment and retaliation claims against her employer, Judge Black,
and Likins. 233
Did the plaintiff in Morris establish a prima facie case of retalia-
tion?234 The outcome would likely depend on which circuit the case
was heard in and which standard the court applied to define adverse
226 Morris, 201 F.3d at 787.
221
222 Id.
22] Id.
224 Id.
223 Morris, 201 F.3d at 787.
226 Id.
222 Id.
226 1d.
229 Id.
239 Morris, 201 F.3d at 787.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 See id.
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employment action.235 In the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the plaintiff
would fail because she cannot show that she was subject to an ultimate
employment decision. 235 In circuits that employ the intermediate
threshold, the results might differ because of the undeveloped state of
the law on liability for retaliatory harassment. 237 In circuits that adopt
the liberal case-by-case or EEOC deterrence approach, the plaintiff
would almost certainly establish a prima facie case for retaliation. 238
This is because the plaintiff would likely have been deterred from op-
posing the perceived sexual harassment. had she known that she
would face Likins's increased inappropriate, harassing behavior.239
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, employing the intermediate stan-
dard, held that although her sexual harassment claim failed, the
plaintiff in Morris established a prima facie case for retaliation.240 The
court reasoned that because the U.S. Supreme Court in Burlington
Industries, Irtc. V. Ellerth and Faraghe• Ti. City of Boca Raton, held that se-
vere or pervasive supervisory harassment constitutes discrimination
under section 703(a), such harassment likewise can replace adverse
employment action and fulfill that prong of the prima facie case for
retaliation.20 The court then stated that. the defendant would have
the opportunity to prove the affirmative defense outlined in Elle•th. 242
Because of the potential for different results, employers and em-
ployees are left without a clear understanding of what facts are
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. 243 The U.S. Su-
preme Court should grant certiorari to address the disagreement
among the circuit courts of appeals and should adopt the broad,
EEOC deterrence approach.244
233
 Compare Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecornms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002),
with Von Gunter v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001), and Mattern v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997).
236 Sec Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 ; 1144 (8th Cir. 1997); Mattern, 104 E3c1 at
707.
237 See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Srvs., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999);
Margery Corbin Eddy, Finding Me Appropriate Standard for Employer Liability in Title VII Re-
taliation Cases: An Examination of the Applicability of Sexual Harassment Paradigms, 63 ALB. I..
REV. 361, 363 (2000).
238 See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 2000); Wideman v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456-57 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,
supra note 12, at 8-13.
239 See U.S. EQUAL OPPORnINUIY COMM'N, supra note 12, at 8-13.
249 201 F.3d at 791, 792.
241 See id. at 792.
242 Id.
243 See supra notes 234-242 and accompanying text.
244 See infra notes 245-331 and accompanying text.
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B. Language, Purpose, and U.S. Supreme Court Precedent Support
the Broad, Deterrence Approach
1. The Plain Meaning of "Discrimination" Is Most Consistent with the
Broad, Deterrence Approach
Although there is ambiguity in the term "discrimination" in sec-
tion 704(a), the broad, deterrence approach is most consistent with the
language and purpose of Title VII generally and section 704(a)
specifically.245 The language of section 704(a) is best read to support
the broad standard.246 Because section 704(a) lacks the limiting lan-
guage of section 703(a), it is more likely that Congress intended for
"discriminate" to be more broadly construed, rather than restricted
only to ultimate employment decisions. 247 The dictionary definition of
"discriminate" is "to make a difference in treatment or favor on a basis
other than individual merit," and thus the plain meaning of the term
supports a broad rather than restrictive interpretation. 248 Therefore,
the language of the retaliation provision supports a liberal construction
of the provision.249
2. Reading Section 703(a) Qualifiers into Section 704(a) Is
Incompatible with U.S. Supreme Court Precedent
Rather than accord "to discriminate" its plain, broad meaning,
some courts and advocates of the intermediate threshold read the
qualifying language of section 703(a) into section 704(a). 25° Some
scholars invoke the principle of tinsdem generis. 2" This stands for the
proposition that when a general term follows a specific one, it should
be understood as a reference to similar subjects of the specific enu-
meration. 252 Therefore, the qualifying language of section 703(a)
would be read into section 704(a), and would limit the term "discrimi-
245 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1), -3(a) (2000); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 345-46 (1997).
246 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), -3(a); U.S. Num. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note
12, at 8-14.
247 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), -3(a); U.S. Etzunt. OPPORTUNITY COMM .N, supra note
12, at 8-14.
248 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ON-LINE DICTIONARY, at http://www.rn-w.com/cgi-bin/dic-
tionary?book=llictionary&va= discriminate (last visited Jan. 31, 2005).
249 See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
259 See Morris, 201 F.3d at 791-92; Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300
(3d Cir. 1997).
251 See Cude Sc Steger, supra note 3, at 397-98; Glover, supra note 107, at 610.
252 Sec Cude Sc Steger, supra note 3, at 397-98.
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nate" in that provision to compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment. 253 Although this approach is not inconsistent with
the U.S. Supreme Court's approach in Robinson u Shell Oil Co., where
the Court looked to other provisions to define "employees" under sec-
tion 704, the Court in Robinson also made clear that it was interpreting
the term liberally to effectuate the broader goals of Title VII. 254 There-
fore, one should interpret the language in light of the purpose of Title
VII generally and the retaliation provision specifically.255
The purpose of section 703(a) is to prevent discrimination on the
basis of protected categories with respect to the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. 256 The goal of section 704(a), however, is
somewhat distinct—to ensure access to Title VII statutory rights, so
that people are not deterred from voicing their complaints of dis-
crimination. 257 A reading of section 704(a) in conjunction with the
qualifying language of section 703(a) overlooks the specific goals of
the provisions.258
Taking the language of section 704(a) together with U.S. Supreme
Court precedent further supports a liberal approach. 259 The Court has
interpreted Title VII broadly to effectuate its remedial goals, and for
example, has construed the retaliation provision liberally. 260 In Robin-
son, the Court made it clear that the purpose of section 704(a) is to
"[m]aintainll unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms." 20
The Court in Robinson concluded that the term "employee" encom-
passes former as well as current employees. 262 To interpret "employee"
otherwise would mean that employers could discharge employees in
retaliation for their filing a discrimination charge and suffer no legal
consequences. 263 In adverse employment actions, courts should simi-
larly employ a liberal standard in order to allow employees effective
255 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1), -3(a).
251 See 519 U.S. at 345-46.
255 See id.
256 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1)-(2).
257 See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.
256 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1)-(2), -3(a); Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.
252 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802
(1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Robinson, 519 U.S. at
346; Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
26° See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346; Meri-
tor, 477 U.S. at 73.
281
 519 U.S. at 346.
262 Id. at 345-46.
263 See id. at 345.
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access to Title VII's remedies.264 By considering adverse employment
actions to include any activity that would likely deter an employee from
reporting discrimination, the purpose of section 704(a) will be most
closely followed, as it was in Robinson. 266
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court's 1986 decision, Metitor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, demonstrates the Court's broad construction of sec-
tion 703(a) of Title VII, the general discrimination provision. 266 In Merl-
tor, the Court held that discrimination in section 703 (a) is not limited to
economic or tangible discrimination; it can also be found where a plain-
tiff was subject to a hostile work environment that was sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment and
create an abusive working environment. 267 Although section 703(a)
does not provide an explicit cause of action for a hostile work environ-
ment, the Court held that in light of Title VIPs purpose, something less
than an ultimate employment decision may be actionable. 268 Therefore,
discrimination under section 704(a) should be interpreted at least as
broadly as section 703(a), because the former does not contain the
qualifying language of the latter. 269 The statutory construction in Meritor
and Robinson, along with the Court's articulation of the purpose of sec-
tion 704(a), demonstrates that the deterrence or broad approach is
most consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 2"
3. The Contention That the Lack of Qualifying Language Leads to a
Narrower Interpretation Is Flawed
In addition to the split between the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals resulting in varying outcomes, legal commentators likewise are
divided as to what standard should be adopted in evaluating whether
conduct amounts to an adverse employment action. 27' As with the split
among the circuits, the disagreement can be traced to how the term "to
discriminate" should be interpreted in section 704(a). 272 The scant leg-
islative history of Title VII provides little guidance. 2" Whereas section
264 See id. at 345-46.
265 See id.
266 Set 477 U.S. at 73.
267 Id. at 64.
266 See id.
269 See 42 U.S.C.§§ 2000e-2(a) (1), -3(a) (2000); Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
270 See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345-46; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
271  See Cude & Steger, supra note 3, at 396; Kravetz, supra note 3, at 368; Wiles, supra
note 3, at 238.
272 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
27] See Zion, supra note 8, at 196.
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703(a) lists the ways in which an employer cannot discriminate against
employees, such. as through "compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment," section 704(a) does not. 274 Proponents of the
restrictive, ultimate employment decision standard construe the term
"to discriminate" in section 704(a) to proscribe only ultimate employ-
ment decisions, rather than the other types of actions described in sec-
tion 703(a). 275 Instead of viewing the absence of qualifying language in
section 704(a) as broadening the scope of discrimination, supporters of
this view contend that it actually limits it to only ultimate employment
decisions.276 If the drafters wanted retaliatory discrimination to include
the actions enumerated in section 703(a), some commentators argue,
they would have included them in section 704(a). 277 As they did not,
only ultimate employment decisions are actionable. 278 This reasoning,
however, is flawed in light of the plain language of the statute, as well as
the way the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the statute in the
past. 279
C. The 
	
FMC's Adoption of the Deterrence Standard Bolsters the
Argument in Support of This Approach
Not only do the language of the statute and U.S. Supreme Court
precedent support the broad approach to defining adverse employment
action, the EEOC also adopts a broad, deterrence approach.280 In Meri-
tor the U.S. Supreme Court noted that, although not binding, EEOC
guidelines constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants properly may resort for guidance. 281 The
EEOC is the administrative agency with the task of enforcing Title VII;
therefore, its interpretation should be accorded some weig 11 0132 In Ali-
tot; the Court adopted the EEOC's view that harassment leading to non-
economic injury could amount to a cause of action under Title VII. 285
274 See 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(a) (1), -3(a).
273 See Matteru, 104 F.3d at 708-09 (stressing that the vague proscription present in sec-
tion 703(a) is lacking from section 704(a), and therefore the provision was meant to ad-
dress only ultimate employment decisions).
276 See id.
277 Sec Wiles, supra note 3, at 233.
278
 See Matters, 104 F.3d at 708-09.
279 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Robinson, 519 U.S. at 345-46.
m U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM O N, supra note 12, at 8-13.
281
 477 U.S. at 65.
282 See id.
283 Id. at 66.
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In interpreting the retaliation provision, the EEOC makes its dis-
approval of restrictive standards clear in its Compliance Manual. 284 The
Compliance Manual states that the retaliation provision proscribes any
adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and that is rea-
sonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in
protected activity.285 Although the EEOC's standard is broad, it does
not include trivial annoyances because these would not be sufficient to
deter a person from opposing a discriminatory practice. 286 In 2000, in
Ray v. Henderson, the Ninth Circuit specifically adopted the EEOC's de-
terrence approach, stating that it is consistent with its prior case law
and most closely upholds the language and purpose of Title V11. 287 The
EEOC's endorsement of this approach bolsters the argument in sup-
port of its adoption by all circuits. 288
D. The Deterrence Approach Is Necessary in. Light of the
Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense
In addition to being harmonious with Title VIPs language, pur-
pose, and precedent, the broad, deterrence approach is also the most
logical given the affirmative defense announced by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1998 in Ellerth and Faragher. 289 In Ellerth, the Court held that
employers may be liable for supervisory harassment amounting to a
hostile work environment?" When there is no tangible employment
action taken, an employer can avoid liability in a supervisory hostile
work environment harassment claim by establishing an affirmative
defense.29i The employer must show (1) that the employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harass-
ing behavior, and (2) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed
to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities pro-
vided by the employer or otherwise failed to avoid harm. 292
The second prong becomes significant in a court's choice of
standard in evaluating adverse employment action in retaliation
284 U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUN rry COMM'N, supra note 12, at 8-13.
2e6 Id.
286
267 217 F.3d at 1243.
285 See Mentor, 477 U.S. at 65; see also Timothy H. Madden, Note, Adverse Employment Ac-
tions: The Wisdom of EEOC Guidance, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 739, 745 (2002) (discussing courts'
deference to the EEOC).
289 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
2" 524 U.S. at 765.
291 Id.
292 Id.
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cases.295 If an employee who is being sexually harassed by a supervisor
did not utilize internal grievance procedures, due to fear of being re-
taliated against, an employer in a formal charge could invoke the
affirmative defense to avoid liability. 294
 The employer could argue that
the plaintiff's fear was unreasonable, and therefore he or she unrea-
sonably failed to use the opportunities provided by the employer. 295
To encourage employees who are being discriminatorily harassed
to use opportunities provided by the employer to remedy the situa-
tion, the law must protect against any retaliation that is likely to deter
the employee from coming forward 2 9° If employees are not insulated
against such retaliatory acts, employees might endure the harassment
rather than report it and face reprisal not amounting to a material
change in employment. 297
 This leaves employees in a lose-lose situa-
tion—if they fail to use the procedures provided by the employer, they
could potentially lose out on recovery in a harassment. case, or if they
utilize internal procedures, they could risk facing employer retaliation
amounting to less than an ultimate employment decision or a mate-
rial change to the terms and conditions of employment. 298
 Therefore,
in order to effectuate the purpose of the retaliation provision, it is
necessary to apply the broad, deterrence standard.299
E. Employers' Workplace Autonomy Is Protected in Other Parts
of a Retaliation Claim
The previous arguments focused on ensuring employees' access to
Title VII remedies; employers, however, likewise have interests that
should not be overlooked.500 Those in favor of the restrictive standard
argue that without the strict limitation, employees will use section
704(a) to combat every employment decision with which they are un-
happy. 501
 This would prevent employers from being able to effectively
299 See id.; Marshall, supra note 124, at 577-78.
294 See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Marshall, supra note 124, at 578.
295 Sec Marshall, supra note 124, at 578.
296 See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 396; Marshall, supra note 124, at 576-78; U.S. Equitt, OP-
PORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 12, at 8-15.
297 See Marshall, supra note 124, at 578.
299 Sec id. at 577-78.
299 Sec id.
m° Sec Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 79 (2d Cir. 2000); Rosser v. Laborers' Intl Union,
Local 438, 616 F.2d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1980); Hochstadt v. Worcester Found, for Experi-
mental Biology, 595 F.2d 222, 233 (1st Cir. 1976).
301
 Matteru, 104 F.3d at 708; Cude & Steger, supra note 3, at 398.
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manage the workplace. 302 An off-shoot of this argument is that courts
will be inundated with retaliation claims and employers will have to ex-
pend massive resources to defend against frivolous lawsuits. 903 Without
a bright-line standard, proponents argue, employers will not be able to
adequately identify and prevent illegal retaliation. 304
Those in support of the intermediate standard—that adverse em-
ployment actions are those that materially affect the terms and condi-
tions of employment—argue that this standard will effectuate the pur-
pose of Title VII by allowing courts to respond to the facts of particular
cases, without spurring trivial claims. 805 Proponents of this standard,
like those in support of the strict standard, contend that the broad ap-
proach will open the floodgates of litigation and bombard the courts
with frivolous claims. 3" Additionally,. they maintain that employers are
in the best position to manage the workplace effectively, and they
should be able to do so without unwarranted judicial interference." 7
Further, proponents argue that employers will not be able to prevent
discriminatory retaliation if they do not know how to recognize it. 308
Concerns that employers will not be able to discipline or termi-
nate the employment of inappropriate or incapable employees with-
out facing a lawsuit are valid.509 The requirement of adverse employ-
ment action, however, is not the appropriate portion of a retaliation
claim to take these concerns into account. 310 Additionally, the deter-
rence standard will not provide a cause of action against merely trivial
annoyances in which the plaintiff or others would not be deterred
from engaging in the protected activity."
Any action that an employer takes in retaliation of a protected ac-
tivity, which would likely deter that activity, should be actionable.312 This
is because it best serves the purpose of section 704, which is to maintain
access to the remedies for discrimination provided in Title vri.313 This
902 See Cude & Steger, supra note 3, at 398.
3°3 See Wiles, supra note 3, at 237.
5()4 See id.
305 See Rusie, supra note 156, at 403; Wiles, supra note 3, at 238, 239-40.
306 Sec Cathy Currie, Note, Staying on the Straighter and Narrower: A Criticism of the Court's
Definition of Adverse Employment Action Under the Retaliation Provision of Title VII, 43 S. TEX L.
REV. 1323, 1346 (2002); Wiles, supra note 3, at 237.
3" See Currie, supra note 306, at 1344; Wiles, supra note 3, at 237.
"3 See Currie, supra note 306, at 1344; Wiles, supra note 3, at 237.
3119 See Cude & Steger, supra note 3, at 408.
310 Sec Matima, 228 F.3d at 79-80; Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233.
911 U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMIWN, supra note 12, at 8-13.
5" Id.
913 See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346.
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.does not mean, however, that employers should be liable for disciplin-
ing or even discharging a troublesome employee.s" A plaintiff should
not be able to establish a prima facie case for retaliation when he or she
constantly complains in a hostile or disruptive manner. 515
The protected activity prong of the prima facie case is the more
appropriate aspect to take into account the disruptive nature of a
plaintiff's complaints.m A plaintiff should not be able to meet this
requirement when he or she engages in opposition that is hostile and
excessively disruptive.317 In 1976, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in
Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology held that be-
cause the employer was unable to effectively manage its workplace
due to the disruptive and inappropriate complaints of the plaintiff,
the employer was not liable for taking actions to eliminate the disrup-
tion.318 Because the plaintiff's opposition to the employer's practices
was exceedingly hostile and disruptive, the court balanced the work-
place setting and the interests and motivations of the employer and
the employee 319 Hochstadt shows that the protected activity require-
ment can be used to ensure that courts do not constrain the em-
ployer's ability to manage its workplace effectively. 320
Another way that the courts take into account the employer's
ability to manage the workplace is through the "legitimate business
reason" portion of the burden-shifting framework. 321
 When an em-
ployee has clearly engaged in a protected activity, such as filing a
charge with the EEOC, but also has been insubordinate or disruptive
with complaints at work, an employer similarly should not be liable
for disciplining or discharging that employee. 522 The employee could
satisfy the protected activities requirement, but the employer could
show that it had a legitimate business reason for its action, such as dis-
ciplining a hostile or disruptive employee. 325
 This is precisely what the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2000 in Matima v. Celli.324 In
that case, the plaintiff engaged in a number of oppositional activities
314 Sec Matima, 228 F.3d at 79; Rosser, 616 F.2d at 224; Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233.
313 Sec Matima, 228 F.3d at 79; Rosser, 616 F.2d at 224; Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233.
316 See Hochstadt, 545 F.2d at 233.
317 See id,
318 Id. at 233,234.
319 Id. at 232.
329 Sec id, at 234.
321 Sec Matima, 228 F.3d at 79-80.
322 Sec id. at 80.
323 Sec id. at 80-81.
324 See id, at 81.
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and filed a formal charge of discrimination.328 The employer, how-
ever, provided ample evidence that the plaintiff's actions disrupted his
work and the work of his coworkers and supervisors. 326 The plaintiff
constantly confronted his supervisors in inappropriate ways, leaving
the company with no choice but to discharge him in order to effec-
tively manage the company.327
It is clear that employers retain the authority to discharge or dis-
cipline employees as they see fit, so long as their motivation in doing
so is legitimate rather than retaliatory. 328 Adopting the deterrence
standard will not give plaintiffs a cause of action against trivial annoy-
ances in the workplace.329 These would not be sufficient to deter the
plaintiff or others from engaging in the protected activity. 330 There-
fore, the concern that employers would be liable for every small
workplace decision they make is unfounded."'
CONCLUSION
Because of the potential for inconsistent results, the U.S. Supreme
Court should grant certiorari and establish a uniform standard for
evaluating the adverse employment action requirement in a Title VII
retaliation claim. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
broad, deterrence approach is the most appropriate standard in light
of the language of section 704(a) and U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
The Court has stated that the purpose of section 704(a) is to maintain
unfettered access to Title VII's statutory remedial mechanisms. By fo-
cusing on whether an employer's act would deter the plaintiff or others
from engaging in the protected activity, this purpose is followed most
closely. The possible harsh results of the Ellerth/Faragher defense, absent
applying the liberal standard, further bolsters this argument. Concerns
that every workplace action would satisfy the deterrent standard are
unsubstantiated because this standard would not consider trivial an-
noyances actionable. For these reasons, the Court should adopt the
EEOC's broad, deterrence approach.
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